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Abstract
Howare language, thought, and reality related? Interdisciplinary research on
this question over the past two decades has made significant progress. Most
of the work has beenNeo-Whorfian in two senses: One, it has been driven by
research questions that were articulatedmost explicitly andmost famously by
the linguistic anthropologist Benjamin Lee Whorf, and two, it has limited
the scope of inquiry to Whorf ’s narrow interpretations of the key terms
“language,” “thought,” and “reality.” This article first reviews some of the
ideas and results of Neo-Whorfian work, concentrating on the special role
of linguistic categorization in heuristic decision making. It then considers
new and potential directions in work on linguistic relativity, taken broadly to
mean the ways in which the perspective offered by a given language can affect
thought (or mind) and reality. New lines of work must reconsider the idea
of linguistic relativity by exploring the range of available interpretations of
the key terms: in particular, “language” beyond reference, “thought” beyond
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EFFECTS OF LINGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION
InApril 1985,TexasTechUniversity student and rape victimMicheleMallinmistakenly identified
26-year-old Timothy Cole as her attacker, first from a photograph, then in a police lineup. Cole
would later die in prison after serving 13 years of a 25-year sentence for a crime he did not
commit (see http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Timothy_Cole.php). Many factors
are known to contribute to such unthinkable distortions of memory, but one may seem surprising:
the role of language. The science of memory has shown that if we verbally describe something we
have seen, as when a victim describes an attacker to police, this act of putting experience into words
can overshadow our exact recollection of the original experience (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler
1990; see also Loftus & Palmer 1974, Lupyan 2008).1 By verbalizing something, we can become
more likely tomake a wrong decision on the basis of what we said we saw (and now believe we saw).
Schooler & Engstler-Schooler (1990) discovered this effect in relation to how people remember
faces: If we see a face and then describe it in words, we will later be worse at recognizing it than if
we had not verbally described it at all. They also found that committing perceptions to words can
make memory worse for another perceptual domain: color. In an experiment, they showed people
a set of subtly different hues. Some were asked to describe the colors in words. These people were
worse at later identifying the exact color they had seen. Those who had not verbally described
the original color, on the other hand, were better at remembering it. By saying what they saw,
those in the first group were allowing language to deplete or alter their mental representation
of the original experience. This happens with faces and colors because they are domains that
“defy linguistic description” (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler 1990, p. 66)—no language makes
distinctions among faces or colors anywhere near as finely as our visual discrimination can. The
authors concluded that “[s]ome things are better left unsaid” (p. 67).
How is it that recounting an experience inwords can cause a distortionofmemory?This effect of
language on cognition is a by-product of an otherwise critical function of language: categorization.
To categorize things is to group them together, treating them as effectively identical for some
purpose by disregarding or discarding irrelevant differences (Cohen & Lefebvre 2005, Levinson
&Majid 2014). Language is centrally involved. The concepts that words encode are ready-at-hand
devices for categorizing (Taylor 2004, Enfield 2015). So, for example, even though no two fish
are the same, we treat them as the same when we refer to them both with a single word fish. Of
course the person who says I caught two fish today should know whether they were the same or
different species, but their addressee cannot know just from hearing the phrase two fish. Linguistic
categorization omits distinguishing information. Now because we know that the meanings of
words differ greatly across languages {see semanticists from Boas [1966 (1911)] to Goddard &
Wierzbicka (2014)}, the information omitted in any verbal act of categorization must be different
in different languages. English does not put a sturgeon and a dolphin in the same basic-level
category, but many other languages do. In Lao, the word paa covers fish and dolphins in a single
concept (Kerr 1972, p. 591). A comparison of any two languages will quickly yield thousands of
examples such as this (see Bowerman & Levinson 2001, Gentner & Goldin-Meadow 2003, Evans
2010b, Malt & Wolff 2010, Riemer 2010, inter alia).
The trusted concepts that words and other linguistic symbols provide give our minds ways
to economize by omitting needless detail. We may save on mental processing, for example, by
not having to remember a particular fish’s irrelevant peculiarities once we have classified it as
a fish. The trade-off, as the research on overshadowing shows, is that we may lose later access
1It is not known if language was a factor in TimCole’s misidentification, but the overshadowing research gives us every reason
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to context-specific details that we could have otherwise stored. On balance, the trade-off is
good. Most of the time we do not need the details. But once in a while details turn out to be
indispensable. We learn this if we find ourselves buying the wrong tint of paint for the house or,
more consequentially, convicting an innocent man.
WHORFIANISM
If language can imperceptibly constrain or channel our thoughts in ways like this, it raises a
counterintuitive challenge to our sense of free will. Do our trains of thought run on tracks laid by
language, such that each different language takes our thoughts to a different place? A lineage of
language scientists has posed and explored these questions, from Herder (1992) in the eighteenth
century and vonHumboldt [1988 (1836)] in the nineteenth, to Boas [1966 (1911)] and Sapir (1949)
in the twentieth century and evenmore recently (see Leavitt 2010). Perhaps the best-known author
to pose this question is the anthropological linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf (see Whorf 2012).
Whorf ’s considerable accomplishments in Native American andMesoamerican linguistics, in-
cluding his 1930s fieldwork on the Aztec language and his contributions to the decipherment of
Mayan hieroglyphs, are still referenced in specialist literature of that area. In linguistics more gen-
erally, Whorf made lasting contributions to the study of how meaning is encoded, both overtly
and covertly, in grammatical systems. But Whorf is discussed most for his proposals concern-
ing relations between language, thought, and reality. In a short article written in 1939, titled
“The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language,” Whorf considered the possible
role of language in human error leading to accidental fires, drawing on his professional experience
as an insurance investigator (see Whorf 2012, pp. 173–204). What he pointed to was not unlike
the verbal overshadowing effect for faces and colors. In line with previous proposals by Boas and
Sapir, Whorf argued that a linguistically grounded habit of thinking might play a causal role in
nonlinguistic behavior. In one of his fire insurance examples, an explosion occurred when workers
were careless with cigarettes near empty gasoline drums.Whorf reasoned that if anEnglish speaker
thinks of a gasoline drum as empty because there is no gasoline in it, this use of the English word
empty suggests to the person that there is literally nothing in the drum. Hence the person ignores
the possibility that the drum is, in fact, full of vaporous fumes, and hence the dangerous behavior.
If you think this means Whorf was taking language to be the sole determinant of behavior, or
even a straitjacket for thought, you would not be alone. But Whorf never said these things nor
did he think them. Presenting his case in the “condensed and unqualified form” required for that
short article, he had hoped the reader “would use his thinking apparatus” and adjust accordingly
(these quotations from a letter to his editor cited in Lee 1996, p. 153). In response to his editor’s
suggestion that he may have overemphasized the role of language in channeling behavior, Whorf
explained,
I have thought of possibly adding a brief statement or a footnote saying that I don’t wish to imply
that language is the sole or even the leading factor in the types of behavior mentioned such as the
fire-causing carelessness through misunderstandings induced by language, but that this is simply a
coordinate factor along with others. It didn’t seem at first that this should be necessary if the reader
uses ordinary common sense. (Lee 1996, p. 153)
Here iswhatWhorf suggested.Whendecidinghow tobehave, onemight naturally use language
in thinking, and in so doing one may effectively discard, or fail to notice, important information
that happens not to feature in a linguistic rendering of the state of affairs at hand. It is not that
people cannot comprehend alternative depictions of reality. Nor is it that we cannot think without
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language. It is that we are creatures of habit. If language is our most practiced resource, it should
be no surprise that language instills deep cognitive habits: habits of attention and disattention,
habits of reasoning—or failing to reason—in deciding how to act.
HEURISTIC THINKING
A common gloss of Whorf ’s view is that a language will predispose us to think certain things. But
we could just as well—or better—say that a language predisposes us not to think certain things.
The fact that people fail to notice much of what goes on around us is now well established (Grimes
1996, Simons & Levin 1997). Research on rational heuristics in decision making shows that to
routinely disregard a portion of the available information not only is a common strategy, but in
fact makes good sense (Gigerenzer et al. 2011). The logic of decision making includes a desire to
minimize the costs involved. It is the same from small things, such as choosing which brand of
cigarettes to buy, to big things, such as finding a marriage partner. Once you have locked on to
the problem (e.g., Which one to choose?), your next step is to find ways to narrow the search for
an appropriate solution and “lock off ” by making the decision that yields the best balance: desired
benefit for lowest cost. And a decision should be made without unnecessary delay in order to get
on with solving the next puzzle in the stack.
Take a simple decision such as choosing what to order at a restaurant. One strategy would be to
study the entire menu and weigh all the options, comparing them on some criteria and selecting
the best. But such thoroughness could be cognitively and socially costly and a waste of time.
A good alternative is the strategy known as satisficing (Simon 1956, 1983; compare Gigerenzer
2007, Kahneman 2011): Do not waste your time studying all the options; simply settle on the first
solution that is good enough for current purposes and stop the search. So, if you already like the
idea of the mushroom risotto, it may not pay to keep looking at the menu in the hope of finding
something better.
How do we determine what qualifies as good enough? One way is to use concepts. Concepts
are tools in decision making because they give us criteria for recognizing instances of what we are
looking for and of what we are not looking for. In this way, concepts are sieves (Kockelman 2013;
Enfield 2015, p. 172). They are means for deciding, and thus for acting. Whorf ’s idea was simply
that language is likely to play a central role in decision making along these lines. At the root of
this idea are two facts: (a) the most ready-at-hand concepts are the ones encoded in the languages
we speak,2 and (b) the languages we speak are known to differ radically in the kinds of concepts
they encode. This suggests a prima facie argument for a form of cultural relativity grounded in
differences between languages. If concepts provide a basis for categorization and decision making,
and if different languages supply their speakers with different concepts, then different languages
provide their speakers with different bases for decision making and, subsequently, for different
patterns of behavior.
Somemay recoil at the idea of relativity (or relativism) in any form, appealing to common sense.
Philosopher Paul Boghossian opens his antirelativist book Fear of Knowledge with a controversy
surrounding Native American origins (Boghossian 2006). Although many archaeologists believe
that humans migrated ten millennia ago from Asia into America via the Bering Strait, someNative
Americans believe that their people emerged onto the Earth from a subterranean spirit world.
These two versions of reality are, of course, not equally valid (or at least not valid in the same
2Of special interest forWhorf and many since was the encoding of concepts in grammatical as opposed to lexical forms, given
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way). There are facts that do not stop being facts just because we believe something else. Rocks
will sink, whether you like it or not. But there are other versions of relativity than those grounded
in a refusal to acknowledge brute facts. A version of relativity more likely to succeed begins with
the observation that we cannot determine facts independently from the measuring instruments
that are used. Our primary measuring instruments are our bodies (Gibson 1979, Ingold 2000).
Why can dogs hear sounds we cannot? Because dogs have different bodies than we do. For humans
with human ears, ultrasonic noises may as well not be real (although we can infer their existence
using other means, from hi-tech instruments such as spectrograms to low-tech measures such as
visual observations of dogs’ behaviors). The body defines an individual’s horizons, both limiting
and licensing our possible perceptions and actions. If you have the body of a bat, a pitch-dark cave
will seem like a good place to be.With the body of an earthworm you will feel at home in a stretch
of turf. If these are not different worlds, they are certainly different worldviews.
Along similar lines, each language is a kind of body for thinking and acting. Philosopher ofmind
Gilbert Ryle advocated a view of cognition as a public phenomenon, defining it not by putative
internal states but by the “assemblage of performances” that such states enable (Ryle 1949, p. 45;
Enfield 2013, p. 58). To perceive or understand the world is to relate to it, interpret it, and react to
it. The reasoning involved draws on concepts and categories in a range of ways, and, as is clear to
anyone who looks, many if not most of our concepts and categories are supplied by the languages
we speak.
This is pretty much what Whorf and his predecessors were suggesting. As Edward Sapir,
Whorf ’s teacher at Yale, wrote, “[T]he language habits of our community predispose certain
choices of interpretation” (Sapir 1949, p. 162). On this view, the study of different languages,
especially of those that are most different from so-called Standard Average European (Whorf
2012, p. 358), has the potential to supply us with new and different ways of actively interpreting
the world. Whorf avidly promoted the study of lesser-known languages, such as those of Native
America, because each provides an opportunity to broaden our understanding in one more way.
Although nobody is “free to describe nature with absolute impartiality,”Whorf argued, the person
who would come closest “would be a linguist familiar with very many widely different linguistic
systems” (Whorf 2012, p. 274). Today’s language explorers are fulfilling this ambition. As Evans
(2010a, p. 155) writes, “we study other languages because we cannot live enough lives.”3
NEO-WHORFIANISM
How are we to treat Whorf ’s idea today, some 75 years later? Some have taken it to be no
more than a suggestive framework, serving as a conceptual guide for anthropological research or
as a source of hypotheses for experimental testing (see Gumperz & Levinson 1996, Gentner &
Goldin-Meadow 2003). Others have pressed too hard on the idea, dismissing it for its failure to
take the weight (McWhorter 2014). But it is not clear that Whorf ’s work was designed to bear
that load. Nor are people always critiquing the thing that Whorf actually proposed. Cognitive
anthropologist Stephen C. Levinson describes the problem: “It is as if the topic of ‘Whorfianism’
is a domain where anybody can let off steam, go on mental holiday, or pounce upon an ideological
enemy” (Levinson 2003a, p. 25). Whorf commentator Penny Lee counts the ways Whorf has
been “misread, unread, and superficially treated” (Lee 1996, p. 14; see also Levinson 2012, p. xiii,
footnote 3).
3These words are adapted by Evans from those of literary critic Harold Bloom: “We read because we cannot know enough
people.”
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Table 1 Lucy’s three types or levels of linguistic relativity (Lucy 1997, p. 292)
Type or level of linguistic relativity Characterization
Semiotic “How speaking any natural language at all may influence thinking”; does having a code
with a symbolic component transform thinking?
Structural “How speaking one or more particular natural languages (e.g., Hopi versus English) may
influence thinking”; do quite different morphosyntactic configurations of meaning
affect thinking about reality?
Discursive “Whether using language in a particular way (e.g., schooled) may influence thinking”; do
discursive practices affect thinking either by modulating structural influences
or by directly influencing the interpretation of the interactional context?
In spite of various objections and misconstruals, Neo-Whorfian explorations developed and
extended Whorf ’s ideas toward the end of the century and ever since (see Brown & Lenneberg
1954; Brown et al. 1958; Hymes 1966; Rosch 1977; Silverstein 1979; Hale 1986;Wierzbicka 1989;
Schultz 1990; Hill & Mannheim 1992; Lucy 1992, 1996; Gumperz & Levinson 1996; Michael
2002; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow 2003; Kockelman 2010; Webster 2014; among many others;
Whorf 2012 includes an extended bibliography). The work has covered much ground; the case
has been made both for and against a linguistic relativity hypothesis, often in strong terms, from
multiple perspectives, in relation to a range of (usually nonsocial) ontological domains, including
color, space, and time, and using a range of methodologies.
Over the past couple of decades, people have tried to define or characterize possible types or
elements of linguistic relativity. This has been done not just as a step toward better understanding,
but also as awayof singlingout the lines ofwork thatmaybemostworthwhile pursuing, for example
because they are methodologically more tractable, conceptually more coherent, or empirically
more promising.
As we can now see, the pie can be cut in many ways. Lucy (1997, p. 292), for example, suggests
that there are “three types or levels” of linguistic relativity (Table 1; see also Lucy 1992, 1996).
Bloom & Keil (2001, pp. 352–53) identify four loci at which distinctions can be made; there is
partial overlap with Lucy’s (1997) taxonomy (Table 2).
Wolff & Holmes (2011, p. 254) distinguish seven “classes and subclasses of hypotheses on how
language might affect thought.” Two of these are briefly considered and dismissed from the scope
of interest: first, the idea that language affects thought because thought is language, and second,
the idea that while thought and language are separate, language can determine and overwrite
Table 2 Bloom & Keil’s (2001, pp. 352–53) distinctions in linguistic relativity effects
Locus of distinction Contrast
Language versus languages Effects that are language-general (i.e., effects of having language versus not having it)
versus effects that are language-specific (i.e., from being a speaker of Language X versus
Language Y)
Parts of language that matter Syntax versus words
Magnitude of effect Mild versus massive
Types of effects Produce effects on our online perception of the world
Shape the categories we form
Enable us to perform logical inference and causal reasoning
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Table 3 Wolff & Holmes’ (2011, p. 254) five ways that we see effects of language on thought




Thinking for speaking “Encoding for later expression”; i.e., how we think about an experience may be
guided by considerations for how we may have to code it linguistically later on
Thinking with
language
Language as meddler “Linguistic representations compete with nonlinguistic representations”
Language as augmenter “Linguistic representations extend/enable nonlinguistic representations”
Thinking after
language
Language as spotlight “Language makes certain properties highly salient in nonlinguistic thinking”
Language as inducer “Language primes certain types of processing in nonlinguistic thinking”
patterns of thought. Wolff & Holmes are interested instead in five remaining ways by which we
may see a language–thought relationship, each of which begins with the assumption that “thought
and language differ structurally” (Table 3).
Other recent taxonomies include Reines & Prinz’s (2009, pp. 1027–28) four types of linguistic
relativity (radical, trivial, habitual, and ontological) and Gentner & Goldin-Meadow’s (2003,
pp. 9–10) three types of language–thought relation (language as lens, language as tool kit, and
language as category maker). As these sources show, the project has now gone well beyond
Whorf ’s specific observations and suggestions. Much of the extensive literature is reviewed in the
articles cited above, as well as in book-length review treatments, most recently by Leavitt (2010)
and Everett (2013); see also the wide-ranging bibliography in Whorf (2012). There we see many
ways that language diversity correlates with patterns of cognitive diversity: Our visual perception
and categorization of color distinctions can be affected by cross-language differences in color
vocabularies (Roberson et al. 2005, Winawer et al. 2007, Roberson & Hanley 2010); our implicit
evaluations of the characteristics of inanimate objects such as bridges can be affected bywhether the
relevant word is grammatically feminine (as for “bridge” in German) or masculine (as in Spanish;
Boroditsky et al. 2003); our reasoning about spatial relations can be affected by the frame of
reference that is dominant in a language (cardinal directions in some languages versus left/right
in others; Haviland 1993, Levinson 2003b, Majid et al. 2004, Haun et al. 2011). Further examples
abound.
NEW DIRECTIONS
So we can no longer say, as Lucy (1997, p. 291) could nearly 20 years ago, that there is “relatively
little empirical research” on linguistic relativity. But the research that has been done, penetrating
as it is, has covered only a thin slice of the possible scope of this topic because Neo-Whorfian work
has been fairly consistent in its narrow interpretation of the three key concepts. Reality has been
taken to mean the realm of objective, nonsocial facts: “concepts of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘matter’”
(Whorf 2012, p. 178). Thought or mind has been taken to mean general, nonsocial cognition:
forms of categorization, reasoning, and memory about reality as perceived. And language has
mostly been taken to refer to structural and semantic features, synchronically framed, with a focus
on the referential functions of words and other linguistic signs. Restricting the scope in this way
has delivered valuable progress. But it is time to consider the larger space of things that could or
should be regarded as instances of linguistic relativity.
Several important contributions to the linguistic anthropological literature have recognized
the limitations of dominant work on linguistic relativity and have pointed to ways forward. Hymes
(1966) proposed a “second type” of linguistic relativity, having to do with the effects of culture
on the social functions of language. Silverstein (1976, 1979) built upon this idea and elaborated a
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view of linguistic relativity that follows from the fact that “people not only speak about, or refer
to, the world ‘out there’—outside of language—they also presuppose (or reflect) and create (or
fashion) a good deal of social reality by the very activity of using language” (Silverstein 1976,
p. 194). He identified language ideology—in particular the native view that language is mostly
for referring to things—as a force that “affects the strategy of language use” (Silverstein 1979,
p. 194). Friedrich (1979, 1986), Sherzer (1987), and Webster (2014) have called for due attention
to be paid to relativity in the poetic functions of language (cf. Leavitt 2011, p. 201; see below).
And Michael (2002) presents an approach to linguistic relativity that is concerned not with the
impact of referential semantics on individual thought, but with the inherently social question of
“how concrete discursive practice impacts processes of distributed cognition” (Michael 2002, p.
114; cf. also Everett 2005, 2012; Zinken & Ogiermann 2013).
To build upon efforts such as these, and to identify candidate lines of work for sustained
attention, researchers must chart a full possibility space by reconsidering the core elements of the
linguistic relativity idea: language, mind, and reality. In the following sections we briefly consider
only two dimensions along which a possibility space could be mapped: the multiple functions of
language beyond reference, and the type of reality that exists solely by virtue of our beliefs and
commitments, namely, social reality.
Language and Its Functions
Most Neo-Whorfian work has taken language to be primarily a referential device. Li & Gleitman
(2002, p. 266), for example, explicitly identify language as a “means for making reference to the
objects, relations, properties, and events that populate our everyday world.” But the referential
function of language is just one among several (Austin 1962; Silverstein 1976, 1979, 1981, 2014;
Zinken 2008; Kockelman 2010). Jakobson (1960) defined six basic types of functions that a piece of
linguistic behavior can have: emotive, poetic, conative, referential, phatic, and metalingual. These
functions are nonexclusive. Any swatch of language can usually be seen to perform several if not
all of these functions at once. This is not just a conceptually useful scheme; it is theoretically well
grounded in the core elements of a communicative act involving two people and a shared code:
sender, message, addressee, context, channel, and code (cf. Shannon 1948). Thus, whereas the
referential function orients to the context, picking out or construing objects and events for mutual
attention, the phatic function, for example, orients to the channel, opening up or maintaining a
connection between interlocutors.
So we could, for example, frame the matter of linguistic relativity in terms of language’s phatic
function, and we would surely see significant diversity in this functional domain as an outcome
of the language being used. Consider a form of linguistic relativity implied by differences in the
modality of a language: audible-plus-visible in the case of spoken language versus visible-only
in the case of sign language. Opening up and maintaining a connection between interlocutors
is a very different matter in a spoken language than it is for deaf people using a sign language
(Baker 1977, Wilbur & Petitto 1981, Lieberman 2014). The differences have implications both
for cognition and for action:
Deaf children interacting through the visualmodemust take into account their interlocutor’s perceptual
state in order to carry out a successful interaction. A deaf child must understand that it is not enough
to be able to see his intended addressee but that the addressee also must be visually attending to the
child as well. Thus, before any conversational turns can take place, a child must first evaluate the locus
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when visual attention is established can a successful interaction take place. This ability to take into
account another person’s locus of attention arguably requires a level of visual perspective-taking skill
that typically does not develop before the age of 24 months. (Lieberman 2014, p. 2)
As Lieberman explains, in adult signed discourse, “attention is obtained using a set of con-
ventional behaviors, including tapping the addressee, waving a hand in the addressee’s line of
vision, pounding a surface, or even stomping one’s foot” (Lieberman 2014, p. 2). When the
channel of communication becomes a locus of contention—as happens for example in confronta-
tional talk between intimates—again modality-specific effects are heightened. In a quarrel in sign
language, a person may force the channel to stay open by physically turning someone’s face to-
ward them (and hence their gaze) if they have looked away; or they may force the channel shut
by closing their eyes or even by holding an interlocutor’s arm or wrist to prevent them from
signing.4 Quite different manipulations of the channel would be implied in the case of spoken
language.
These examples suggest the possibility of a form of linguistic relativity grounded in the phatic
function of language and manifest in the domain of social attention and action rather than (solely)
in perception, conceptual structure, or reasoning. Forms of linguistic relativity such as these are
not included in the taxonomies given above (Tables 1–3), precisely because those taxonomies
focus on language’s referential function and on the relatively private and nonsocial psychological
domains of conceptual structure and reasoning.
What is wrong with focusing our attentions solely on the referential function of language?
The answer is that there is no objective basis for regarding the referential function—or any
other of these functions—as the core function of language (independent from possible claims of
the uniqueness of this function in language). Research on linguistic relativity must therefore in
principle give equal attention to these other functions of language (this point has of course been
made before: see Friedrich 1986 for an extended exploration of linguistic relativity in relation
to the poetic function of language; see also Sherzer 1987; Dingemanse 2011, 2014; Webster
2014).
Why is the referential function sowidely treated as the privileged ormain function of language?
One reason is that currently dominant work on linguistic relativity is carried out within research
frameworks such as psycholinguistics that have been heavily focused on reference. This focus is,
in turn, a function of linguistic ideology grounded ultimately in our natural cognitive habits of
linguistic awareness (Silverstein 1981): It is easier to single out and focus our attention on the
referential function than on other functions, leading us naturally to gravitate to it in any kind
of metasemiotic practice, including in our research (Silverstein 2014). Although the restriction
to reference may be explained in terms of these inherent disciplinary, ideological, or cognitive
limitations, it may also simply have been a shrewd methodological choice, giving the work the
focus needed to achieve its ample successes. Whatever the case, such self-imposed limitations
should not be allowed to stay in place for too long.
Reference-oriented approaches to linguistic relativity will benefit from more serious engage-
ment with approaches to language that have tended to view it as a tool with a broad functional
scope (Enfield et al. 2014). Kockelman (2010), for example, exemplifies an approach that looks
for multiple structural and functional domains of language in which a particular cultural and
cognitive perspective can be repeatedly manifest. On this approach, linguistic categories in a given
4Thanks go to Trevor Johnston and Adam Schembri for helpful information about these aspects of sign language usage.
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ethnolinguistic ecology are analyzed not just with respect to words or grammatical constructions,
but in light of the full gamut of “morphosyntactic forms, semantic features, pragmatic functions,
and discourse frequencies” that may be both signs of and causes of linguistic relativity effects
(Kockelman 2010). A linguistic-anthropological program is particularly promising not only
because it seeks to draw on multiple types of phenomena in pursuing a proper understanding of
linguistic relativity—beyond the referential function of language—but also because it ultimately
looks to understand the relationships between these types and with their social, cultural, and
cognitive contexts.
Language and Social Reality
Lucy (1997, p. 291) defined linguistic relativity with this question: “Does the particular language
we speak influence the way we think about reality?” Some have even said that reality itself can be
different from the perspective of different languages. As Sapir put it, “The ‘real world’ is to a large
extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group” (Sapir 1949, p. 162). The idea
that a language can determine a state of reality makes little sense if the word reality is understood
in the usual Neo-Whorfian sense of brute reality. But how might differences among languages
affect social reality? Searle (1969, 2010), following Austin (1962), has long argued not only that
social or institutional reality can be created using language—as when the words used in wedding
vows create new rights and duties—but that all social-institutional reality, from monetary values
to property rights to corporate identity, is built from language and cannot exist without it. What
is of interest here is that whenever language is used to create social reality in these ways, it is never
just language but always a language. And again, because we know that the conceptual distinctions
made available by different languages can differ radically, then linguistic diversity implies diversity
in the kinds of reality that language can create.
Obvious examples concern the explicit performatives that are used for formally bestowing new
statuses, such as vows, initiations, and christenings. The relevant words and concepts for such
rituals in different languages and communities will be as diverse in content as the ethnographic
contexts of their use. But consider the rights and duties that words can bestow in a less formal
sense, namely the social accountability that all speech acts presuppose and/or create (Heritage
1984, Sacks 1992). If I assert that something is true, then I become publicly accountable for
having done so. If what I asserted turns out to be untrue, then I can be said to have lied or to
have been mistaken. Or if what I asserted turns out to be amazing, then I can be praised and
celebrated. Such accountability—both negative and positive—shows that the language-specific
meanings of linguistic forms can be directly implicated in the construction of a form of social
reality that defines how others may respond to us and that thus defines our very selves (Linton
1936, Goffman 1959). If we acknowledge that language by its nature is the tool through which our
social selves are created, through the creation and distribution of rights and duties, then different
languages will differently determine the kinds of selves we can have.
As discussed above, Whorf ’s example of the “empty” gasoline drums is usually understood
as being about reasoning, implying that the person involved used the word empty in some sort
of internal dialogue, which led them to make a certain decision: “Empty” means no gasoline,
which implies that it is not dangerous. Another way to frame it, though, is that the effect has to
do with the linguistic presupposition and creation of social accountability. The situation Whorf
was writing about was precisely this: an insurance case in which culpability was being assessed.
The status of the word empty, in this account, is not just as a guide for private thought, but also
as a potential basis for public defense if someone were held accountable for his/her behavior.
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its semantic/pragmatic properties, the person has certain forms of accountability available to him
and, in turn, is subject to those forms of accountability.
We see in social interaction that people use fine distinctions in word meaning to negotiate
rights and duties associated with the social situations they find themselves in. Sidnell & Barnes
(2013) describe a case in which two children dispute whether one of them had “tapped” an object
or “poked” it, with obvious implications for culpability depending on whose version is accepted.
Thus, any such semantic distinction implies the possibility of accountability, and that possibility
is always present in social interaction (Garfinkel 1967). It suggests the following prediction: If a
language makes fine distinctions in meaning in some domain, people who speak that language will
be subject to a different normative background for interpretation and accountability than they
would be in the context of a language that does not make the same fine distinctions.
Consider any of the countless studies demonstrating that a semantic domain is finely differen-
tiated in the vocabulary of one language but not in another. What, for example, is the significance
of the fact that the Maniq language of Southern Thailand features a special semantic elaboration
of reference to odors that is not found in English (Wnuk&Majid 2014)?Wemay observe that this
elaboration correlates with (implying is caused by) a special cultural concern with odors (Wnuk &
Majid 2014; see alsoMajid&Burenhult 2014). But if we are going to explain why words exist, what
we need to explain is not why people think those thoughts but why they use those words.We need
a motivation for people not just to make the distinction, but also to make the distinction public
(Enfield 2015). Invoking social accountability for behavior—including linguistic behavior—is an
important function of words and, thus, an important reason why people will use the words they
use in social life. So we can predict that because a Maniq speaker can make differentiations of
reference to smell in her language, she may be held accountable by other speakers for having
incorrectly made, or for not having made, available linguistic distinctions in referring to a certain
smell that may have been perceived. Without such distinctions in one’s language, it is surely less
likely that such accountability will be presupposed or anticipated.
The semantic distinctions made in your language conspire to create a “web of inferences”
(Levinson 1983, p. 321)—that is, you can use only the words that local convention provides, and
youmust also accept andwork within the likely or inevitable patterns of interpretation or inference
that others in your community will apply. For instance, as Grice (1989) insisted, whatever you
say may be used as evidence of what you are choosing not to say. The crucial point here is that
such inferences are made relative to an available linguistic system, and thus the constraints you
face in inviting or avoiding possible inferences when formulating linguistic actions in context are
linguistically relative constraints.
Because language itself is a kind of social reality, we can consider the effects of language even
on language itself as a candidate domain for linguistic relativity effects. Take the case of typo-
logical dependencies among subsystems in languages. If verbs come after objects in a language
(“She rice ate” rather than “She ate rice”), then it will be more likely in that language that adpo-
sitions will come after nouns (“the table on” rather than “on the table”; Greenberg 1966, Croft
2003). The reason for this correlation is that the two types of relation—verb–object and noun–
adposition—are not independent, often because they historically derive from the same source,
through social processes that are mediated by psychological tendencies to preserve harmony in
mental representation (Enfield 2014, pp. 17–19).
It therefore seems possible that typological dependencies between subsystems of language
present a candidate instance of linguistic relativity. They show that the way reality is created
(i.e., the diachronic creation of social-cultural reality in the form of linguistic convention), via
ontogenetic and microgenetic processes of thought and behavior, will differ depending on the
initial state of the linguistic system. We know that inference drives grammaticalization, and we


















































































AN44CH13-Enfield ARI 10 September 2015 8:57
know that the inferences people make are the ones made possible or likely by the state of the
system (Hopper & Traugott 1993). If the state of language spoken determines the operative
patterns of markedness and their expressive and interpretive effects, then possible changes or next
states in a language—mediated by the thoughts and actions of its users (Enfield 2014, p. 19)—are
defined relative to the current state of the language and by the norms of its established usage
patterns.
In a final example of linguistically relative effects on social reality, consider work that focuses on
language in social interaction as a tool for constructing social actions (Sacks 1992, Schegloff 2006,
Sidnell & Stivers 2012, Enfield & Sidnell 2014, Jefferson 2015). Research in this area is becoming
increasingly comparative (see Sidnell 2007, 2009; Stivers et al. 2009; Zinken & Ogiermann 2011;
Dingemanse & Enfield 2014; Dingemanse & Floyd 2014), thus opening up a new horizon for
linguistic relativity effects. As Couper-Kuhlen & Selting (2001, p. 8) hint, “the way interaction
itself is conducted may be influenced by (typologically) different language practices.”
Sidnell & Enfield (2012) make the case with a comparative study of speech act formation in
Creole, Finnish, and Lao by considering how these languages use different grammatical resources
to construct the same rather specific pragmatic action, that of “agreeing with what someone just
said while conveying that one has greater authority to say it” (Sidnell & Enfield 2012, p. 320).
When Creole speakers perform this action, they use a linguistic practice that “treats the prior turn
as uncertain”; the Finnish practice effects the same action but in addition “foregrounds different
perspectives”; and the Lao practice “introduces a sense of finality” in addition to effecting the basic
action. The linguistic relativity effect being observed here is not about the things that different
languages canmake you think. It is about the different rights andduties that speech acts in languages
can give you. The example reveals that language-specific side-effects on normative obligations in a
next conversational move arise because of the unavoidable introduction of collateral effects when
communicative tools have multiple functional features:
Because such social action is done with the tools that our languages provide and because these tools are
structurally overdetermined through their rich meanings and multiple functions, the conventionalized
selection of such tools will have language-specific collateral effects on the final nature of the action.
On this view, the language you speak makes a difference in the social actions you can perform. The
language-specific vehicle or means for an action—even where that action is a general goal or end that
we expect people will want to pursue in any cultural context—will shape the action as a function of the
structures it introduces. . . . Differences in language structure lead to linguistically relative collateral
effects, which lead in turn to differences in our very possibilities for social agency. (Sidnell & Enfield
2012, pp. 320–21)
Onlywhenwe frame language in terms of agencywill we properly understand theways inwhich
it is used to create social reality. Recent advances in the conception of language and agency (Ahearn
2001, Duranti 2004, Kockelman 2007, Enfield & Kockelman 2016) are helping to place language
function within the dynamic distribution of mind, where mind is understood as active, distributed,
and social-relational in nature (Enfield 2013). With language as a semiotic system of means to
ends (Zipf 1949), its users acquire, claim, and develop rights and duties in relation to the defining
elements of linguistic agency: flexibility and accountability. Thought of in this light, linguistic
relativity is readily observed and understood in newways. If our patterns of linguistic residence and
representation are defined in terms of semiotic flexibility and accountability (Kockelman 2013)—
both social-relational notions at their core—then the scope of linguistic relativity broadens: Our
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CONCLUSION
Linguistic diversity is causally related to cultural and cognitive diversity in numerous ways. Some
effects of language on thought are now widely acknowledged to be real. But their possible interac-
tions with the true diversity of human languages remain understudied. We do not know if effects
such as verbal overshadowing are the same for all members of our language-using species, partly
because we are still mapping the real extent of semantic and grammatical diversity. Imagine that
linguists discovered a language with a vocabulary for faces so perfect that you could recognize
a person from the verbal description alone. An attacker’s face would no longer “defy complete
linguistic description,” with the result that words in that language would not overshadow people’s
memory for faces, and we could expect lower rates of wrongful conviction in that community
based on witness misidentification. Linguistic fieldwork may yet uncover such a language, with
a fine vocabulary for faces, but in the meantime we know that English is not it (Schooler &
Engstler-Schooler 1990).
Not all the known effects of language on thought are as consequential as the witness misiden-
tifications that can destroy people’s lives. And not all linguistic effects are as innocuous as many
Neo-Whorfian findings seem to be: a subtle perturbation that color vocabulary can create in one
eye but not the other (Gilbert et al. 2006), or a subconscious sexual stereotyping of inanimate
objects such as keys or bridges in association with the grammatical gender of words (Boroditsky
et al. 2003). Those who admit only a weak version of linguistic relativity sometimes add that the
weak version is trivial or uninteresting. The problem with doing so is that we have no indepen-
dent measure of what we should find interesting. An effect of language on thought is an effect of
language on thought. If it means a speaker of one language is more likely to come home from the
hardware store with the wrong shade of paint, then that might sound harmless, but not if it leads
to a domestic argument. Nor is it harmless if a worker is more likely to cause a factory fire—or
to misjudge his own potential culpability—or if a witness is more likely to put a man in prison
for a crime he didn’t commit. So we cannot and must not dismiss as trivial the possibility that
the effects of language on thought and social reality can influence behavior and thereby affect our
lives. Whether they do remains an empirical question.
Neo-Whorfian work has made real advances, but it has covered too little ground, given its
narrow, nonsocial definitions of the key concepts. More imagination is needed. The mind, includ-
ing the parts that are built through language, is a purpose-made tool kit for cognitive and social
action, just as a body is a tool kit for physical action. And because languages are so differently
structured, each one is like the body plan of a different species, affording its users different ranges
of possibilities.
A language, then, does not imprison you; it equips you. A language is not a straitjacket; it is an
action suit. Whorfian approaches to linguistic relativity have been concerned with the idea that
people with different languages are “not equivalent as observers” (Whorf 2012, p. 283). We must
now explore the idea that people who have different languages are not equivalent as agents.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. Neo-Whorfian approaches to linguistic relativity have thrived over the past two decades,
thanks to an inspired generation of researchers, mostly with an orientation to psychology
and its methods. Empirical work has yielded findings and insights that allow us to better
test, analyze, and understand linguistic relativity phenomena.
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2. The conceptual limits of Whorfianism have become virtually naturalized. The specific
way thatWhorf happened to characterize the three key elements of linguistic relativity—
language as reference, thought as perception and reasoning, and reality as the physical
world—has now been so widely adopted that other understandings of these elements
now remain largely out of view in research on linguistic relativity.
3. The key elements of linguistic relativity—language, mind, and reality—can each be un-
derstood in diverse ways. There is more to language than reference, more to mind than
perception and reasoning, and more to reality than the physical world.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
1. There ismuch room for new research on relativity effects relating to functions of language
other than reference; these include the emotive, poetic, conative, phatic, and metalingual
functions of language. Although somework is already exploring these functional domains,
in some ways even the most basic work remains to be done.
2. Aspects of mind beyond perception and its link to reasoning will be fertile ground for
further linguistic relativity research. Promising directions for research on the effects of
language differences on mind include the emotions, personhood, and the distribution of
agency.
3. Whorfian claims are particularly striking when they imply that physical reality can be
different for speakers of different languages. There is another form of reality—social
or institutional reality—that is no less real in human affairs. Because social reality is
arguably itself a product of language, it is particularly amenable to investigation as a
locus of linguistic relativity.
4. Acknowledgment of the full breadth of understandings of the core concepts—language,
mind, and reality—should lead to the development of broader, richer, more nuanced defi-
nitions of linguistic relativity. The central claim of linguistic relativity could be defined as
follows: If two people speak two different languages, these people will have significantly
different perspectives; this means that they may feel, think, and act differently or may be
treated differently from each other because of the language they speak. It may mean not
only that they could come to have different understandings of reality, but also that they
may be able to create different understandings of reality in other people. Further work
must explore the possibility that speakers of different languages can be different kinds of
agents and patients and, thus, different kinds of people.
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